Material from Translation of Japanese and German Documents

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timerover51
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Material from Translation of Japanese and German Documents

Post by timerover51 » Fri Jun 21, 2013 2:10 am

Just wondering what would be the rules from posting information from translations of captured Japanese and German documents that are cited in Allied intelligence bulletins? I have accumulated a fair amount of those.

Go for it... it sounds interesting
LH///

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Yavid
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Re: Material from Translation of Japanese and German Documen

Post by Yavid » Tue Dec 31, 2013 12:44 am

I have a copy of a book written in the 80s it's an account of the War through the Allies eyes from decoded or captured documents. I've shared several times info about the war using it as a source but I don't think I've ever said where info came from
Behold the Power of Yavid

timerover51
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Re: Material from Translation of Japanese and German Documen

Post by timerover51 » Sun Jun 29, 2014 2:14 am

timerover51 wrote:Just wondering what would be the rules from posting information from translations of captured Japanese and German documents that are cited in Allied intelligence bulletins? I have accumulated a fair amount of those.

Go for it... it sounds interesting
LH///
Hmm, some of it is a bit sensitive, like some of the translations of captured Japanese diaries and instructions to military government in occupied areas. Some of it would be more useful to the miniature gamers fighting tactical games, like information on penetration of German Spaced Armor by Allied weapons. They do have a LOT of good identification drawing though.

timerover51
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Joined: Mon Aug 27, 2007 10:31 am

Re: Material from Translation of Japanese and German Documen

Post by timerover51 » Sun Jul 13, 2014 6:20 pm

The following material concerning Spanish terms for entering World War 2 on the side of Germany comes from the following source.
The Spanish Government and the Axis :
No. 6.Notes Covering the Interview Between the Fuehrer and Count Ciano in the Presence of the Reichs Foreign Minister and the State Secretary Meissner in Berlin on September 28, 1940
The Spanish proposals to Germany, somewhat crassly expressed, go as far as the following:

1. Germany is to deliver for the coming year 400,000-700,000 tons of grain;
2. Germany is to deliver all the fuel;
3. Germany is to deliver the lacking equipment for the Army;
4. Germany is to put up artillery, airplanes, as well as special weapons and special troops for the conquest of Gibraltar;
5. Germany is to hand over all of Morocco and besides that, Oran, and is to help her get a border revision in the west of Rio de Oro;
6. Spain is to promise to Germany, in return, her friendship.
The source can be accessed through this HyperWar site:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/index.html

Franco was not asking for much, was he.

timerover51
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Re: Material from Translation of Japanese and German Documen

Post by timerover51 » Sun Jul 13, 2014 6:32 pm

This is the sort of problem that cannot really be anticipated in non-combat testing. The report comes from the War Department Military Intelligence Division's publication Tactical and Technical Trends No. 5.
During the recent fighting there were two cases of British Valentine tank drivers being killed and collapsing over the gear lever. The remainder of the crew were unable to remove the driver to get at the gear lever on the clutch and were unable to stop the vehicle. A similar incident occurred in a British Matilda tank during General Wavell's
advance, although in this case it should have been possible to disengage the clutches with the hand wheels provided. It is considered that all Armoured Force vehicles should be fitted with a means for stopping the engine from the fighting chamber.

A "dead man's switch" is fitted to most gasoline driven tanks. The question of providing the British Covenanter and the American tanks with this switch is being considered.
(M/A Report, London, No. 47672.)

timerover51
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Re: Material from Translation of Japanese and German Documen

Post by timerover51 » Sun Jul 13, 2014 6:37 pm

The following very interesting bit of data comes from the intelligence report covering the recovery of a Japanese Zero from Akutan Island in the Aleutians in mid-1942. The source is the same as the previous post, MID Tactical and Technical Trends No. 5.
The radio compass was made by Fairchild Aero Camera Co., New York City. Aerial #429. Loop located in pilot enclosure just in back of pilot's seat. Controls located on right hand side of cockpit. L or R meter located on instrument dash board. This equipment looked as though it had been used before it was installed in this plane. Frequency range, 170 to 460 and 450 to 1200 KC. Switch was located in the 450 to 1200 KC position when gear was removed.
Emphasis added.

timerover51
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Re: Material from Translation of Japanese and German Documen

Post by timerover51 » Sun Jul 13, 2014 6:49 pm

Some notes by the British on German air attacks on Malta in 1942. The source is MID Tactical and Technical Trends No. 6.
Until the middle of March, with one exception, only JU 88's were used by the Germans. Later JU 87's were also constantly used. The JU 88's approached between 12,000 and 18,000 feet and came in at angles that varied between 30° and 60°, releasing their bombs at 6,000 to 9,000 feet, sometimes pulling out as low as 4,000 feet. Generally, the JU 87's dived very steeply, pulling out at the same height as the JU 88's.
Note, that is a fairly high pull-out altitude for dive-bombing, and will reduce accuracy considerably.
After delivering their attacks bombers took violent avoiding action, turning and changing height until clear of the island, and did not normally come low enough to make good targets for light antiaircraft guns. They did not attack light antiaircraft gun positions.
At least in the bombing attacks on Malta, Germans showed the trait, observed in the last war, of doing the same thing at the same time every day. During the heavy raids it was normal routine to receive an attack of about 75 bombers soon after breakfast, a second at lunch time, and a third at about 6 in the evening. This regularity was found to be a great convenience.
Emphasis added on the German predictability.

timerover51
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Re: Material from Translation of Japanese and German Documen

Post by timerover51 » Sun Jul 13, 2014 7:18 pm

The following quote comes from a military study prepared by German officers for the US Army European Command after World War 2. The study is titled: COMBAT IN THE EAST
Experiences of German Tactical and Logistical Units in Russia. As the copy I am working off of is a mimeograph, it did require quite a bit of corrections by me. For those who might wish to verify the accuracy, I am willing to email the document. It is a 15 Megabyte file in PDF format.
Although the composition of trains was well arranged at the time they crossed the German borders, the difficulties engendered by the large distances later often resulted in breakdown of scheduled transportation movements. The locomotives were not equal to the severe cold prevailing during the winter of 1941-42. [Editor Note: This would have been the first winter of Operation Barbarossa.] By comparison, interference through enemy bombing and partisan action was of relatively minor importance. During the winter of 1941-42, only 4 percent of all railway breakdowns between the lower Dnjepr (at Kherson) and the Crimean front, were caused by the enemy while 96 percent were due· to mechanical.failure and the weather.

During the same winter, at times, more than 90 percent of all locomotives within the area of Army Group South were disabled due to damage caused by the severe cold, with the result that railroad traffic was virtually at a standstill. The stockpiling of materiel by the Eleventh Army for the attack on Sevastopol during the summer of 1942 required almost two months because of poor railroad conditions. In the autumn of 1942 the Sixth Army was unable to provide adequate artillery support in the attack on Stalingrad because the railways functioned at only about two-thirds of the minimum capacity demanded.
Note, this report was filed by officers working with Army Group South, which would have presumably had the best weather during the winter of 1941-1942. One can only speculate on the experiences of Army Group Center and Army Group North.

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