Axis & Allies is a classic game of war, economics, and global strategy. Victory goes not only to the team that conquers its opponents on the field of battle, but also to the individual player who seizes the most enemy territory.
is a well established predictor of military victory in Great Power warfare.
WARTIME GDP IN INTERNATIONAL DOLLARS
In 1940 , half of the French GDP is allotted to the Allies, and half is given to the Axis.
"The Economics of World War II" by Mark Harrison, CAmbridge University Press (1998)
In 1939 France and UK confronted Germany over Poland.
Anglo-French GDP on $ 483 billions was superior against Germans $ 411 billions.
Suddenly Germany announces a treaty with USSR. (Oh horror, oh horror)
The Allies may have interpredet this as an Nazi-Commi alliance with a GDP on $ 777 billions, so they expected to lose. This rationalizes Hitlers expectations that the Allies would NOT declare war over Poland.
In 1940 the French ass was waxed, and suddenly UK's GDP on $ 316 billions stood alone against the combined GDP on $ 561 billions of Germany and Italy. An Axis victory seems economically certain.
Then suddenly Germany attack USSR, and this is a close race.
UK +USSR GDP on $ 733 billions against Axis + French GDP on $ 700 billions.
Hitler said that "The world will hold its breath".
Then suddenly the Japanese decision makers are able to reconcile themselves to a war with USA , regardless of the disparity in GDP ($ 1094 billion against $ 196 billion), because of the global balance of Great Power GDP. They belived of a swift defeat and incorporation of USSR GDP by the Axis in Europe.
7 december 1941 the Axis had every reason to belive that the war against the Allies was economically winnable.
Angry wife, must abort
This game start in 1940 with a lot of neutral powers.
In first round of combat against a neutral power just attacked:
*Attacking Tanks roll 2 dices.
*All defending units defend on 1.
This will reflect the Blitzkrieg doctrine. The atacking Germans will face success taking BeloRussia. Ukrain and KArelia, but will be bogged down next turn when their tanks only roll one die and defenders have original value.
italics & emboldens MINE!Griffey wrote:Dear Don,
If you read my text carefully, you will see that I wrote that IN THE GAME it should be possible, but difficult, for Japan to conquer Chungking. In the game as it is, it is not only possible, it is not particularly difficult.
You will also note that I wrote that the Japanese might have succeeded in actual fact, IF they had more time and IF we (America) did not interfere with their vile plans by opposing them. Of course we did interfere, as much as we could.
I did not say that Japan's attack on us was wise, prudent, or a good move, only that it was understandable, which is also your view.
So, I think we are in agreement on everything, except for the question of whether Japan could have evaded the effects of the oil & scrap iron embargo. I think that they could have. An embargo is not a blockade, and even blockades have holes. Embargoes and sanctions have not proven very effective as a tool of coercion. They were a new thing to the Japanese, and this may have inclined them to exaggerate their effectiveness.
If I remember right, Herbert P. Bix (or was it the fellow writing on our naval code breakers?) took another look at the embargo on Japan in his recent book on Hirohito, and found that it had more holes than Swiss cheese. A critical factor, in his view, was that the Japanese leadership was inclined to war as a solution. They made more of the embargo than they need have, because they were in an antagonistic and overwrought frame of mind, rather like some of the writers on these sites. But they might have looked deeper at their strategic dilemma, and adopted cooler and more effective strategies to handle it. A gamer should be allowed to do so too.
HEY! I resemble that 'remark'!
I made some mention before about just HOW the Japanese finally 'decided' upon their ''going to WAR'' against the USA, and I 'laid the BLAME' squarely upon the BRITISH 'shoulders', whereas it certainly SHOULD 'belong' there! Until the 'Raid on Taranto', it was a widely held 'belief' of the Naval Staffs of ALL 'navies', that NO 'Torpedo' attacks in shallow harbors were 'feasible'-until the BRITISH 'showed' otherwise! Then, them damm 'Brits' managed to HAVE their ''Wartime Plans'' about their dispositions and 'response' concerning their ''Pacific Strategies'' captured BY the 'Germans', who then divulged this 'info' upon their erstwhile 'Pacific Allies', who proceeded to work WITH 'this' benefit in plotting their 'Shenanigans' upon the WORLD! DAMM yous 'limeys'!
Japan made that decision all on its own.
Saying Britain is to blame is simply victim blaming (i.e. trying to shift the cause from those responsible to those who were vicitimized by those responsible)
B) Regardless of what holes may or may not have been present in the embargo when it was imposed, the West freezing Japan's assets meant Japan would not be able to continue its conflicts on the level it had been and keep replenishing the goods and matrerials used in those conflicts (i.e. Japan's stockpiles would be depleted).
The longer the embargo continued, the more the holes in it would be noticed and pressure applied to close them (i.e. whatever the situation was at the start of the embargo, it would only get worse).
C) All of this means these choices were the only options available to Japan:
1) Acquiesce to the West's demands (which was deemed politicaly unviable)
2) Do nothing, continue fighting with what it had in stock, which would eventually run out and radically curtail Japan's ability to make war (also deemed unviable because Japan would eventually not be able to fight any more, which means Japan would then be required to select option 1)
3) Attack the West so as to capture the resource areas needed for Japan to continue its conflicts at the level Japan desired (given option 1 is out and option 2 eventually becomes option 1, this was perceived by the Japanese leadership as their only option)
Again, regardless of your point of view, there is only one place to lay the blame for Japan's aggression in China, which in late 1941 and early 1942 became an even wider level of aggression.
And that blame is clearly upon the Japanese leadership of the time.
They could have mad eother choices but they chose conflict then wider conflict.
As for Emperor Hirohito, he was fortunate that the French did not get their way and he was able to avoid being tried as a war criminal.
What was at least known in some circles at the time and recent books on the subject have again revisited was Hirohito was more involved in the decision making, especially with regards to the conflicts started by Japan and Japanese comnuct during those conflicts than he and his family were ever held accountable for.
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