Submarines: Griffey / Krieghund

Closing in... This will be a slower and more deliberate process. It starts with Submarines and moves on from there. This is how I see it. Tell me what's wrong or right about each section. It's in your hands.
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Post by Imperious leader » Tue Mar 08, 2005 6:47 pm

Don Moody/Griffey writes:

"Sea zones, in and of themselves, had no production capability."

"As for the Allies, British merchant shipping levels remained amazingly constant through out the war (between more than 18 and about 22 million tons at any given time) while American shipping *radically* increased during the war (from less than half of Britain's in 1939, c. 8 million tons) to more almost double Britain's (c. 39 million tons) by war's end. "

"Tactically, submarines were - on any strategic level game, and certainly on a game whose scale is each naval unit represents multiple ships (i.e. A&A's scale) - essentially ineffective tactically. "

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in a significant loss of strength for the U.S. Navy and placed that Navy in a defensive posture. The only weapon system immediately available to take the war to the enemy was the U.S. Submarine Force. Indeed, FDR had decided prior to the start of the war that "unrestricted submarine warfare" would be undertaken in the event of hostilities with Japan. Throughout the war, the growing U.S. submarine force was employed in attacks on Japanese merchant shipping as well as on Japanese fleet units when the opportunity presented itself. In both these tasks, the American submarine force was aided by magic- intelligence derived from broken Japanese codes. The Japanese Navy, with Mahanian intellectual roots, prepared tardily and insufficiently for an onslaught not directly related to "decisive battle." The American Navy won a spectacular victory.
The Japanese Merchant Marine lost 8.1 million tons of vessels during the war, with submarines accounting for 4.9 million tons (60%) of the losses. Additionally, U.S. submarines sank 700,000 tons of naval ships (about 30% of the total lost) including 8 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship and 11 cruisers. Of the total 288 U.S. submarines deployed throughout the war (including those stationed in the Atlantic), 52 submarines were lost with 48 destroyed in the war zones of the Pacific.
The American Pacific submarine campaign had substantial direct, indirect and second- order effects on the Japanese economy and the four bases of Japanese military power- Japanese airpower, the Army, the Imperial Japanese Navy and the merchant marine.
The Japanese merchant marine started the war with 6 million tons of shipping. The Japanese Army and Navy each requisitioned a part of the merchant marine to transport and supply their respective operating forces. The Japanese leadership believed they needed to retain 3 million tons of shipping in order to meet the industrial and civilian needs of the economy- although this estimate was probably too low. Two important points need to be made in order to understand the effect of the war on the Japanese transportation system. First, Japan's industrial capacity was proportional to her ability to import needed material. Secondly, due to the extensive drafting of merchant vessels for military needs as well as high losses from American attacks, Japan never achieved the minimum of 3 million tons of capacity required for industrial and civilian uses.
Losses of merchant vessels combined with the indirect loss of a portion of the merchant marine fleet due to convoying significantly reduced Japanese economic strength. Imports of 16 key materials fell from 20 million tons in 1941 to 10 million tons in 1944 and 2.7 million tons in the first 6 months of 1945.The specifics were impressive:

"Bauxite imports fell off 88% just between the summer and fall of 1944. In 1945, pig iron imports plunged 89%, pulp 90%, raw cotton and wool 91%, fats and oils 92%, iron ore 95%, soda and cement 96%, lumber 98%, fodder 99%, and not one ounce of sugar or raw rubber reached Japan."
Moreover, the reduction in imports of raw materials mirrored problems importing food. During 1944, average caloric intake fell 12% below the minimum daily requirement for the non-farming population. The enormous drop in importation of raw materials resulted in a significant drop in Japanese industrial production. In fact, the Japanese mobilization committee stated in a late 1944 report: "Shipping lost or damaged since the beginning of the war amounts to two and one half times newly constructed shipping and formed the chief cause of the constant impoverishment of national strength."
Submarine attacks on the oil flow to Japan were a second critical factor in destroying Japanese military potential. Japanese oil imports fell from 1.75 million barrels per month in August 1943 to 360,000 barrels per month in July 1944. In October 1944, imports fell even more due to high losses around the Philippine battlefields. After September 1943, the ratio of petroleum successfully shipped from the southern regions that reached Japan never exceeded 28%, and during the last 15 months of the war the ratio only averaged 9%. These losses are especially impressive when one considers that the Japanese Navy alone required 1.6 million barrels monthly to operate.Much anecdotal evidence describes Japan's often desperate responses to the American course of action. For example, in early 1945, the Japanese Navy loaded crude oil barrels on battleships to import home, while at the same time the nation experimented with producing gasoline from potatoes.
Aircraft production was strongly affected by the war against Japanese sea lines of communication (SLOCs) due to the lack of raw materials. By April 1944, aircraft engine production had fallen to "critical" levels.The Japanese significantly reduced aircraft engine testing due to lack of aviation gas: from about 8 hours and 5 flights for each engine in 1941 to 2 hours of testing on 10% of the engines built at war's end. The reduction of bauxite imports by 500,000 tons from Indonesia and Malaysia resulted in a 70% drop in aluminum production in 1944.As a result, by the end of 1944, 80% of every plane was made from aluminum pilings, which significantly reduced aircraft quality. By the spring of 1945, the Japanese fabricated major parts of aircraft from wood and they actively planned to construct entire aircraft out of wood.
The war against Japanese SLOCs resulted in significant indirect effects on Japanese air strength. In fact, the reduction in Japan's air power strength was not so much due to the reduction of aircraft quality or production but due to the reduction in pilot quality. Fuel shortages substantially reduced pilot training. In 1944, the great Japanese naval aviator Fuchida complained about the "inadequate training" aviators received prior to attachment to an operational unit. Moreover, once Japanese pilots reached operational units, their training opportunities often did not improve. For example, prior to the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Admiral Toyoda stationed his carriers at Tawitawi near the Borneo oil supplies due to the effective submarine campaign against Japanese tankers. U.S. commanders vectored submarines into the area. Alerted to the danger, the Japanese commander refused to sortie for training- with the result that what little skills his undertrained pilots possessed atrophied. The resulting Japanese aerial defeat became known as the Marinas Turkey Shoot.
An additional indirect effect of the war against Japanese transportation should be noted. Inadequate numbers of merchants and fear of additional losses resulted in the use of barges and small boats to ferry supplies in the empire's combat zones. As a consequence, the Japanese undersupplied forward-deployed units, including ground based aviation units. As an example, one air staff officer noted "a 75% drop in aircraft serviceability in New Guinea from such causes [loss of shipping] and blamed the loss of aerial supremacy over that strategic island on transport shortages."
The loss of raw materials and petroleum and inability to transport items to the front lines lay at the heart of Japan's weakening ability to maintain effective military strength. Munitions Minister Toyoda said as much when interrogated after the war: "the shipping shortage and the scarcity of oil were the two main factors that assumed utmost importance in Japan's war efforts." We will now look at the specific effects of the drop in industrial production and inability to transport goods on Japanese airpower, naval and merchant marine shipbuilding and the army.
The submarine offensive gravely weakened a second pillar of Japanese power: the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). As previously discussed, 30% of total Japanese Navy losses were caused by U.S. submarines. Submarines played another important role in reducing IJN capabilities. Damage to ships, caused in part by submarines, significantly increased ship repair time in Japanese shipyards, thereby reducing opportunities for new construction. The Japanese Navy spent 12% of its construction budget on ship repairs in 1943 and 1944; the figure increased to 34% in 1945.Additionally, the submarine campaign had two important second order effects on the Japanese Navy. First, the necessity to build merchant ships to replace losses resulted in a reduction of potential naval construction. Private shipyards devoted to naval construction fell from 44% of the total in 1942 to 30% in 1943. Secondly, the requirement to build escort ships and naval transports (also to replace merchant losses) reduced the potential to build more powerful combatants. As a result, while the IJN used 14% of its construction budget for escorts and transports in 1941, the percentage shot up to 54.3% in 1944. More astonishing, the need for escorts and merchants was so grave, that after 1943, the Japanese Navy started construction on no ship bigger than a destroyer ! Finally, the American stranglehold on imports, in this case, iron ore, proved fatal to any long term ability to build adequate numbers of warships to replace losses. By September 1944, the Japanese had so little steel that naval construction fell precipitously.
In addition to the direct loss of merchant hulls already described, the Japanese suffered an important indirect effect of submarine warfare caused by the loss of efficiency due to convoying. The entire merchant marine (including that shipping throughout the empire that was not convoyed) had a loss of "carrying efficiency" of 8% between January 1942 and January 1944 with a further reduction of 21% by 1945.However, on the critical line between Singapore and Japan, efficiency declined by 45% between May 1943 and May 1944, with further substantial declines later. Not only did Japan have too few ships, but their ships took longer and longer throughout the war to carry badly needed cargoes the same distances.
In response to American attacks, the Japanese attempted to increase construction of merchants to replace losses. The Japanese used 7% of their total steel production on merchants in 1941 but 46% in 1945.Despite their best efforts, the import crisis hit merchant construction hard. Of note, concentrated submarine attacks on tankers resulted in the Japanese augmenting construction of the vital petroleum carriers at the expense of general-purpose ships. In the fall of 1944, lack of steel forced significant cutbacks on production. Despite considerable efforts, Japan never succeeded in building more than 45% of her losses. In the words of the Strategic Bombing Study, the Japanese "didn't have the production potential to surpass wartime shipping losses." The inability to protect merchants and replace losses could only result in disaster for such a nation so dependent on imports for survival.
The breakdown of the Japanese merchant marine placed grievous logistical constraints on the ability of the Japanese Empire to supply her army deployed throughout the Central and Southern Pacific. Japanese logistical problems first became apparent in 1942 during the Guadalcanal campaign, when an overstrained logistical system and relentless U.S. air attacks resulted in frontline Japanese units receiving only 10% of the supplies comparable American units received. U.S. submarines attacks directly affected the ability of the Japanese to move troops and supplies into important combat zones. For example, concentrated submarine attacks on shipping delivering the experienced 32nd and 35th Infantry divisions to the New Guinea theater resulted in the Japanese convoy disembarking the surviving troops over 500 miles from their destination. As a consequence, the Japanese barged ineffectual penny packets of troops to combat McArthur's forces in Biak and Hollandia.In another case, U.S. submarines destroyed 6 transports loaded with troops destined to boost the defenses of the Marinas before the U.S. invasion of those islands, and sank ships loaded with vital concrete and wire needed for the islands' fortification.The rate of successful delivery of military supplies to front line units averaged 96% in 1942, declining to 83% in 1943, 67% in 1944 and 51% in 1945.These statistics fail to capture the extraordinary indirect effects of both U.S. submarine and air attacks on Japanese merchants as the Japanese had to resort to carrying much of their supplies within the combat zones by slow, inefficient means such as barges, fishing boats and the like. These direct and indirect effects of U.S. attacks clearly impacted Japanese army units. Throughout the war, munitions deliveries were 15% below front line needs, and 33 to 50% of all food sent to the front was lost due to attack or spoilage. Accounts from front line units depict significant efforts to make up for lack of food deliveries by gardening, fishing, or bartering with natives with sporadic accounts of cannibalism in especially poorly supplied areas like New Guinea.
Several important second order and indirect effects must be noted in the U.S. submarine campaign. First, the Japanese used a portion of their submarine force to supply bypassed units. Indeed, the Japanese army and navy each built significant numbers of submarines designed for the express purpose of carrying cargo. Not only were scarce resources wasted in this way, but Japanese submarines that could have been used to attack the extended American logistics train were not properly employed. Another important combined direct and indirect effect of the U.S. campaign against the Emperor's lines of communication was strategic immobility. The inadequacy of total lift and reliance on barges in theater meant large number of Japanese troops could not be quickly moved around the empire. U.S. sea and airpower usually prevented the Japanese from reinforcing islands under attack or removing defeated troops from an island under assault. Therefore, the Japanese could not exploit their advantage of interior lines of communication to move and supply adequate numbers of troops to defeat any of the three major Allied lines of advance in the Pacific theater.

Disproportionate Costs Imposed on Japanese

I have attempted to roughly calculate costs of each side's effort in order to determine whether the U.S. campaign was "efficient." The cost of merchant ships and warships lost to U.S. submarine attack were calculated using actual Japanese prices and added to the cost of all Japanese ASW frigates and corvettes (but not fleet destroyers or ASW aircraft).Using U.S. Navy figures I calculated the cost of the entire fleet of 288 U.S. submarines that served or were built during the war (regardless of whether they served in the Pacific). The result is impressive although not surprising: the Japanese spent at least 42 times more on anti-submarine warfare and in losses attributed to submarines than the U.S. spent on her Submarine Force.
When one considers the fact that the Japanese economy was only 8.9% of the size of the U.S. economy in 1937, the submarine campaign was clearly both an extraordinarily cost efficient and effective means to employ U.S. forces against Japan. Regardless of the cost effectiveness of the U.S. submarine campaign, the military effects were stunningly clear. Fully a year before the end of the war, and before the extensive bombing of mainland Japan, the war against Japanese lines of communication resulted in decisive impact on the Japanese war economy and on the Japanese military logistical system.
For those of you who hate 400 pages of text and want the answer: To sum up things we need convoy boxes to simulate the true aspect of the aformentioned. Plus submarines should cost 6 IP, with destroyers costing 8IP, lastly, submarines real use will be attacking convoy boxes at a disproportionate ratio that has been sufficiently proven and making the allied resolve for achieving victory noticibly slower with regards to Naval affairs.But we of course knew this without another Imperious leaders History lesson and i was only typing this for Griffey and Don Moody. Class dismissed and your quiz will be on friday. Thank you.
Last edited by Imperious leader on Sun Jul 31, 2005 3:29 am, edited 9 times in total.
We really need an Axis and Allies World War one game so i can play that on August 1st, 2014.

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Post by Imperious leader » Tue Mar 08, 2005 7:07 pm

Effects of German Submarine campaign:

At the start of World War II, the German Navy was too small to directly challenge the English fleet for control of the sea. The only strategic possibility for the Germans was to attack allied commerce using their small submarine fleet. Throughout the war, the German Navy conducted a classic guerre de course, using aircraft, surface units and, above all, submarines to attempt to destroy allied commerce. Admiral Donitz's (head of the German submarine force) strategy employed his U-boats at the weakest point in enemy defenses where they could sink a maximum of tonnage. Donitz's goal, therefore, was to cut England's supply of war materiel and, later, to prevent American productive and military capability from influencing the European theater.

In six years of pitched battles throughout the Atlantic, German U-boats, often employing wolfpack tactics and night surface attacks, attempted to destroy opposing convoys. Throughout the war, Allied scientific and technical developments, along with improvements in tactical doctrine, competed fiercely against German technical and doctrinal development. In the end, the vast allied productive capability, which assured plentiful escorts and merchant ships, and superior tactics, weapons and sensors resulted in Allied victory. After May 1943, although they attempted several additional challenges to allied supply lines, the Germans never could truly contest Allied control of the sea.

Direct Effects

During the war the Germans sank 5,150 allied ships displacing 21.57 million tons. Of this, the U-boats were responsible for 2828 ships of 14.69 million tons. To place this in perspective, the Germans sank the equivalent of the entire British merchant fleet at the start of the war. Additionally, submarines destroyed 187 warships, including 6 aircraft carriers and 2 battleships.However, this tremendous destruction came at a heavy price: the Germans lost 785 submarines of 1,158 constructed.

These losses and the loss of valuable cargo are the direct effects of the Battle of the Atlantic. In the end, however, the U-boats did not prevent the U.S. from supplying England with military and industrial goods or food, nor from building up U.S. forces in England (Operation Bolero), nor from providing Russia with substantial material help. Thus, most historians see the Battle of the Atlantic as a German failure.

Indirect Effects

There were, however, substantial indirect and second order effects on the allied war effort. These effects resulted in significant allied logistical constraints. For example, the indirect effects of convoying severely reduced allied transportation capacity. The Allies calculated that a ship took 18-48% longer to sail in convoy. Donitz estimated the loss of time at 33% on average. The impact on Army logistics and U.S. strategy was significant. In response to the German campaign, the U.S. ordered much greater quantities of munitions and supplies that was actually needed, in order to "fill the pipeline," to replace cargoes lost at sea and as a hedge against the Germans cutting the Atlantic supply lanes.

The result of this "loss of time" combined with significant losses (up until July 1943, Allied merchant ship losses exceeded production) had two effects on the Allied war effort. First, the Allies needed to produce and ship more war material than was actually required in theater. Secondly, the Allies possessed less logistical carrying capacity than desired. As a result of the lack of merchant shipping and material, the U.S. Army significantly reduced the size of their planned buildup to far more modest proportions (the original intention in 1942 was to build a large army of 16-17 million men). Although speculative, it is probable that such a reduction meant that the combined U.S. and British Armies would have been incapable of defeating the Wehrmacht without the sizeable Red Army in the war.

Effects on War Production

The U-boat attack on allied supply lines had a pronounced second order effect on allied production priorities. Throughout the war, the Allies had to prioritize between warship, merchant and amphibious production (as well as other uses for steel). In the fall of 1942, the Allies increased amphibious shipping to their highest production priority in a crash program to prepare for Roundup (the planned 1943 cross channel invasion).Yet this buildup came at a difficult time when the Navy was 'straining' to replace the losses from Pearl Harbor, construct a battle fleet to win back dominance of the Pacific and build sufficient escorts and merchants to prevail against the potent German U-boat offensive."

By the winter of 1942-43, the Allies cut back the landing craft program and increased escort production in order to counter renewed losses to German U-boats.Hall concurs, noting that landing craft production was removed from FDR's "must" (highest priority for war production) program comprising rubber, high octane fuel, aircraft, escort vessels, and merchant shipping and pointing out that the change in priority was due to the need to increase escort production. Landing craft production fell off from 105,000 tons in Feb 1943 to 51,000 tons in July 1943.

The Allies' lack of landing craft would logistically constrain allied forces for the rest of the war. General George Marshall noted a "shortage which would plague us to the final day of the war in Europe-the shortage of assault craft, LSTs, LCIs and smaller vessels. This he described as the greatest by far of all the problems."The British official review analyzed the situation in a similar way:

"In so far as the delays in launching the offensive could be attributed to an insufficient supply of landing craft, they were in the last resort due to the high strategic and industrial priority which the Allied leaders assigned to the defense of the shipping lanes."

Operational Impact of German Submarine Offensive

To get full measure of the effects of the Battle of the Atlantic on Allied strategy, we must look at the combined effects of inadequate numbers of landing craft and inadequacy of logistical means due to heavy losses of merchant ships.

"At most conferences of the heads of governments, the shipping experts of both countries met to consider the shipping aspects of any plan under consideration. Account was taken in such discussions both of ships already existing and the timetables for the completion of new ships. Such conferences dealt with a series of facts, or probabilities, some of which it was not too difficult to estimate- such as existing tonnage, rate of production, rate of sinkings. Thus at the Casablanca Conference, in January 1943, shipping- including landing craft and escort vessels- played a major role in the choice between offensives in France, Sicily, Burma and the Pacific."

Heavy shipping losses and the resulting lack of logistical capacity played a prominent role in ruling out a 1943 invasion of France. Experts calculated only 8 U.S. divisions could be transported to Europe (11 without convoy restrictions) by the spring of 1943. Even if the invasion was delayed till September, U.S. forces would number only 12 divisions- which combined with 13 British divisions would be badly outnumbered by the 44 German divisions stationed in the West.

With a cross channel invasion out of the question for 1943, the Allies embarked on a major effort in the Mediterranean - yet logistical constraints and landing craft limitations played a key and limiting role in the formulation of strategy throughout the southern theater. For example, concern over the line of communications played a deciding role in limiting the Allied attack on North Africa to the west of that continent rather than an early allied lodgment in Tunisia. Additionally, at the Casablanca conference, logistical constraints and security of shipping was the key consideration in the selection of Sicily rather than Sardinia as the next target for Allied attack, and in the strong American opposition to more ambitious undertakings against Italy or in the eastern Mediterreanean.

During the fall of 1943, allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic resulted in another change of allied war production priorities. Allied leaders pared back escort production and again increased the priority of amphibious assault shipping.The change came too late to prevent serious restrictions on Allied strategy and the feasibility of operations throughout 1944. Lack of assault and merchant shipping continued to plague Allied planners and resulted in heated discussions at the Cairo and Tehran conferences of late 1943 regarding what operations would be pursued. Lack of lift resulted in abandonment of operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite FDR's promise to Chiang Kai-shek, the Allies cancelled amphibious assaults planned against Japanese forces in Burma. Lack of assault shipping and the desire to maintain an attack up the Italian peninsula towards Rome, resulted in the Allies postponing the Overlord invasion by more than one month. Of greater import, the same lack of assault shipping resulted in postponement of the invasion of Southern France (Anvil). Originally designed to draw mobile German forces away from Normandy, Anvil as executed in August was "disconnected strategically" from Overlord and served little utility.

Reduced Strategic Mobility and the British Import Crisis

Logistical constraints, attributable to the Battle of the Atlantic, resulted in two interesting "what-ifs" affecting the allied effort in Northern France. First, divisions sent into the Mediterranean Theater were "irrevocably bound there for lack of shipping to deploy them elsewhere." While these Allied divisions tied down German troops in Italy, they were unavailable to exploit or reinforce Allied efforts in Northern France, a theater, by the way, which was much more suitable for offensive operations and logistical support. Secondly, had U-boat successes continued for several months longer in 1943 the Allies might have been incapable of a cross channel invasion in 1944. British imports fell to lower than sustainable levels early in 1943, resulting in a request for the U.S. to turn over a large amount of shipping to provide for British import needs. Despite warnings that the total American lift to England and the Mediterranean in 1943 could fall from 1.5 million to 800,000 men, FDR approved the transfer of transports. Only the sudden and unexpected defeat of the U-boats provided a respite for the Allies-and allowed the transports to England to buildup adequate forces for a Cross Channel invasion in 1944.

The U-boat course of action clearly imposed logistical constraints on the Allies and limited their strategic freedom of action. Indeed, one can argue that the Battle of the Atlantic may have delayed the conclusion of the war.

Disproportionate Costs Imposed on the Allies

Morrison stated that the Allies spent "hundreds of billions of dollars" to defeat the U-boat. Donitz noted that he kept his U-boats in the Atlantic after their defeat in order to prevent the Allies from using their freed resources in other ways against Germany. To a casual observer, the Allies apparently employed disproportionate resources in defeating the U-boat menace. In order to understand better the magnitude of the effort the Allies placed in defeating the U-boat threat, the approximate costs of each side's efforts has been calculated. For the Allies, these costs measure some, but not all, direct, indirect and second order costs. In general, the actual cost to the Allies has been underestimated (as will be seen). Three costs were analyzed:

1) Cost of ships destroyed by U-boats, plus the indirect costs associated with the loss of time in convoy (I have assumed 33% of the merchant fleet was thus rendered "ineffective").

2) The cost of ASW escorts and aircraft (this takes into account both direct costs (losses) plus second order costs). Only the cost of aircraft directly associated with ASW was calculated- coastal defense aircraft were not estimated, therefore, aircraft costs have been underestimated. Where prices could not be found (some British ships), I have based the price on an equivalent U.S. ship.

3) U-boat costs where based on the reported German costs (in Marks) with a wartime conversion factor applied. The costs accord fairly well with costs for U.S. submarines when adjusted for differences in construction man-hours.

I have estimated that the Allies spent nearly 10 times what the Germans spent on their U-boat fleet. One should note that German submarine industry employed between 30,000 and 45,000 workers. However, the Americans alone employed 640,000 workers at peak just to construct merchant ships during the war. Thus, my calculation probably substantially underestimates the Allied effort during the war.

In 1937, the combined American and British national revenue was 275% that of Germany. Taking into account Russian national revenue (but not counting countries occupied by Germany), the total allied productive capacity was about 4 times that of Germany. If one assumes that this relative inferiority of productive capability did not change substantially during the war, the Germans still chose a relatively "efficient" cost imposing strategy against the Allies. Another words, the Germans forced the Allies to dispense disproportionate costs in order to maintain control of the sea- resources that the Allies could have used in other ways to better effect.
The disproportionate costs and logistical constraints imposed on the Allies leads one to question the verdict of history that the campaign was a "failure" for Germany. While ultimately, German submariners did not win a decisive victory in the Atlantic, these iron warriors clearly gained time for the German war machine- an extraordinary feat considering that Germany started the war with just 57 submarines and eventually fought the world's two biggest navies combined. The German clearly waged an effective course of action. However, the results of the German submarine campaign would pale in comparison to the U.S. effort.

A. Merchant Ships:

1. Cost of merchant ships lost to sub attack: 14,687,231 tons lost at $420 a ton.

2. It is assumed that 50% of destroyed ships had cargoes and I have estimated the value of each cargo as equivalent to the price of the ship.

3. American Maritime Commission constructed 5,777 ships of 39,920,000 tons during the war that cost $14.2 billion. It is estimated that only 2/3 were used in the Atlantic (this accords well with 61% reported in Leighton's Global Logistics 1940-43 (p.662) which was prior to the increase in lift necessary to handle Overlord).

4. The English and Canadians produced 11.9 million tons during the war. It is assumed their cost of production was as low as in the U.S.

5. The English started the war with 17,430,000 tons. The Americans started with 8.5 million tons (again only assumed 2/3 used in Atlantic). Additionally the Allies seized 3 million tons of shipping from nations occupied by the Axis.

6. It is assumed that 33% of the total merchant fleet was lost due to inefficiency of convoying. That is 11.36 million tons at $420/ton.

7. Repair costs from U-boat attacks were not included.

8. Total: $14.65 billion.

B. Warships:

1. The Americans had 140 destroyers stationed in the Atlantic. Each cost approximately $10 million. Additionally, they had 56 frigates assigned to the Coast Guard. I've estimated their cost as similar to a new frigate ($2.3 million).

2. During the war, the U.S. produced 520 destroyer escorts (DDE) and 96 frigates (FF) for convoy protection. A DDE cost $5.5 million and a FF cost $2.3 million apiece.

3. The Allies built 61 escort carriers that participated in the campaign at a cost of $12 million a piece.

4. The English and Canadians built or seized 169 DDEs. I've estimated their costs as equivalent to a Hunt class DDE ($6.4 million). They also built 156 frigates, 63 sloops (estimated to cost $4 million), 306 Corvettes, 27 other ASW vessels, and 15 armed merchant cruisers (all estimated at $3 million).

5. The English employed about 302 fleet destroyers during the war. I've estimated that only 50% of their missions were related to ASW and that they cost the equivalent of an U.S. destroyer (a probable underestimation).

6. The cost of coastal defense craft and minesweepers used for ASW missions was not estimated.

7. The cost of major warships sank by submarines was not used in the estimate.

8. Total: $10.15 billion.

C. Aircraft:

1. 2828 U.S. patrol aircraft were used in the Atlantic. I've used either exact prices as given by Holley, or the cost of similar aircraft.

2. The U.S. used 4719 tactical aircraft in the Atlantic fleet. I've assumed that 50% of their missions were related to ASW.

3. No costs of the U.S. Army Air Corps or of the Civil Air Patrol (both limited participants in the campaign) were included.

4. I've used the number of English and Canadian squadrons and CVEs (i.e. 24 aircraft per CVE) to estimate total numbers of aircraft. I doubled the numbers to account for losses etc. The total was 740 patrol aircraft and 850 tactical aircraft. This is probably an underestimation when one considers U.S. aircraft numbers.

5. The Allies lost at least 200 heavy bombers in attacks on against U-boat bases or production facilities.

6. To the extent that air operations tend to be expensive relative to the cost of operating ships, allied costs are probably significantly underestimated.

7. Total: $1.6 billion.

The Germans:

1. German data was used to determine the cost of submarines. Where cost data on specific types of submarines could not be found (Type XIV, XXIII, Walther), I estimated the price based upon German submarines of similar displacement, accounting for differences in construction man-hours. The exchange rate was based upon wartime U.S. estimates (I used $.50 per mark, the 1942 estimate). Of note, the cost of a U.S. submarine in 1943 was about $3 million. The figures for German submarines are reasonable when compared to U.S. costs and man-hours required for construction.

2. Type II- 52 boats at $1.03 million.

3. Type VII- 705 boats at $2.25 million.

4. Type IX- 194 boats at $ 3.2 million.

5. Type XB- 8 boats at $ 3.175 million.

6. Type XIV- 10 boats at $ 3.51 million.

7. Type XXI- 123 boats at $ 2.875 million.

8. Type XXIII- 59 boats at $1.03 million.

9. Walther- 7 boats at $2.13 million.

10. Only the costs of the 1,158 submarines completely constructed were calculated.

11. Total: $2.76 Billion

Conclusion: The Allies total investment was $26.4 billion compared to the German investment of $2.76 billion. The Allies spent at least 9.6 times the German investment. Also submarines are a worthwhile investment in the game at 6 IP and you should buy many since it will drown a disportionate amount of damage on Allied economies, which is what their value is in advanced axis and allies



A. Warships:

Tonnage of Japanese Warships sunk by submarines as indicated by JANAC. The costs of all Japanese ships are as listed in U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

1. 8 Aircraft Carriers (219,500 tons) at 3895 Yen/ton.

2. 1 Battleship (31,000) at 2140 Yen/ton.

3. 11 Cruisers (67,050 tons) at 5151 Yen/ton.

4. 41 Destroyers (67,130 tons) at 3522 Yen/ton.

5. 18 Submarines (26,540) at 8317 Yen/ton.

6. 4 Auxiliaries (25,000) tons at 3522 Yen/ton.

The following costs are those of ships built as escorts.

7. Frigates (179,150 tons) at 5575 Yen/ton.

8. Corvettes (25,480 tons) at 5575 Yen/ton.

9. The costs of destroyers and aircraft as well as a variety of small craft used in the ASW role have not been calculated.

10. Total: 2,86 BillionYen.

B. Merchant Ships:

1. 5,121,000 tons sank or probably sank by submarines. According to the Japanese, the average cost of a merchant was 864 Yen/ton.

2. It is estimated that 50% of all ships sank were loaded with cargo and that the cargo was valued at the same price as the ship.

3. It is estimated that 10% of the fleet of 6 million tons was lost due to the inefficiency of convoying.

4. Total: 7.26 Billion Yen

Total: 10.11 Billion Yen

C. Conversion Estimate: Conversion costs are difficult to assess. The cost of a destroyer (since they were relatively similar in both navies) is used to compare. The U.S. paid $6400/ton, the Japanese paid 3522 Yen/ton or about $1000/ton at prewar exchange rates. If one estimates both countries as having equal efficiency, one must multiply the Japanese costs by 6.4. However, according to the U.S. Bombing Survey, Japanese shipyards were significantly less efficient. Japanese costs have been multiplied by 2 (which accords well with length of time to complete equivalent ships) in order to account for this variation in shipyard efficiency for a total multiplication of 12.8.This efficiency factor is conservative. During the war, the Americans estimated that Japanese worker efficiency (based upon prewar industrial data), was 29% that of the U.S.worker.



1. 288 submarines U.S. submarines were used throughout the war.

2. 3 R-class plus Barracuda, Bass and Bonita (returned from mothballs)- $.85 Million per ship.

3. 38 S-boats at $ 1.65 million per ship.

4. 244 fleet boats at $ 3.3 million per ship.

5. Total: $873 million

Conclusion: The Japanese lost or spent 42.3 times as much as the Americans. I And if your still awake by now you will also agree that convoy boxes/zones are perfect for advanced axis and allies.Thanks for reading this for 2 hours, when you knew the answer already...
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We really need an Axis and Allies World War one game so i can play that on August 1st, 2014.

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Interdiction of Supplies as well

Post by GROGnads » Tue Mar 08, 2005 7:26 pm

I'm just 'glomming onto' what 'I.L.' has succinctly put here, but FISHING was 'needed' to provide sustenance for ''the people'' as well as some of the 'byproducts' from this, which was USED in the making of many essential ITEMS! Not only that, but those 'Fishing Vessels' were also akin to 'Spotters' in detecting Enemy Ships in the vicinity, as was accorded THEIR 'importance' when confronted by those same 'Enemy' Vessels which would attempt to SINK them on sight! So the SEAS 'do' provide a 'means' for THIS!~that is, of being given some 'considerations' for the sake of 'argument'! P.S-''Commerce Raiders'' accomplished quite a bit for their 'little efforts'!

"I DO believe in SPOOKS! I DO I DO I DO!''
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"You had to 'GO'!?! Now we ALL have to 'GO'!" BIG Joe-"Kelly's Heroes"-the MOVIE

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Post by Imperious leader » Tue Mar 08, 2005 7:32 pm

yes and we have to account for this by something more symbolic than just sinking transports or having a seperate value for each side that represents what its worth for each belligerent. The basic idea as presented in Pacific solve the abstaction very well without too many complications.
On the second point: Of the battles that insued in and near islands, both sides had very good intelligence as to the composition and heading of most if not all of these ships. Only in the open high seas did the American supremacy of sonar/radar would have a telling effect on naval battles fought in the mid and late periods of the war.
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Post by adlertag » Tue Mar 08, 2005 7:57 pm

delete me
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Post by Imperious leader » Tue Mar 08, 2005 8:19 pm

OMG too funny!!!!!! :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

Your correct as Griffey has proven with perfect clarity: You only need Infantry for land. And as Don Moody has pointed out that Subs have no real impact in the game. As the old soldier has proved we need only "fighters" for air with other choices completly redundant. So what it boils down to is we should undertake Advanced Diplomacy with air power (TM). Just one land, sea, and air unit . But with convoy boxes, blue oceans and lots of mountains in lapland and Norway. Yep that should do it. Just take my name off the box.... :cry: :cry: :cry: :cry: :cry: :cry: :cry: :cry: :cry: :cry: :cry: :cry:
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Post by adlertag » Wed Mar 09, 2005 5:31 am

delete me
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Post by Imperious leader » Wed Mar 09, 2005 2:45 pm

lauchende cow? what is that? Yes its sarcasm at its finest. I am a true master of this art. But all joking aside which your guilty of as well-- I do want many similar things as you.. Terrain, correct colors, no "artistic embellishments" on the board, weather rules, and perhaps gold plated boxes for the pieces. But i do insist on playability as well as historical value. I dont want some huge SPI game that nobody will play. SPI went out of business because of too many of these dry boring wargames with 500,000 counters and 200 pages of rules. Nobody needs that.

your loyal Heydrich...
We really need an Axis and Allies World War one game so i can play that on August 1st, 2014.

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